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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the reasons for the failure of the multilateral resolution of EU cross-border 
banks such as Fortis. We argue that the pre-crisis regime based on soft law and voluntary 
coordination was unable to align the incentives of national authorities acting under the time 
pressure and uncertainty of a banking crisis. We ask whether this experience induced the 
Commission to propose reforms that would close the regulatory gap between integrated cross-
border banks and national resolution regimes. Although, the Commission proposals submitted 
within a year of the crisis considered the more radical reform options, such as shifting the regime 
to the EU level or reorganizing cross-border banks so that they could be resolved on the national 
level, in the end the Commission supported the traditional reform path of deepening soft law 
and strengthening pre-crisis governance arrangements. At the same time, the new financing 
mechanisms introduced to stabilize the Eurozone can pave the way for the introduction of an 
EU-level bank resolution regime, when the next reform opportunity arises. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis tested the viability of the EU’s single banking market and its 
underlying regulatory framework under severe market conditions. It has highlighted the gap 
between the degree of financial integration manifested by the presence of large cross-border 
banks, on one hand, and limited regulatory integration exemplified by the country-based bank 
resolution regimes, on the other. This paper analyzes the EU experience with the resolution of 
failing cross-border banks and reviews the search for reform options during the first year after 
the crisis. 
Exogenous shocks such as financial crises tend to open policy windows for reforms that 
would be implausible during periods of stability (Kingdon 2003, Rodrik 1996, Drazen and 
Grilli 1993). The ‘benefit of crisis’ argument emphasizes the fact that the crisis experience 
forces important stakeholders to reconsider their policy positions, thus opening space for 
policy entrepreneurs who are ready to explore new opportunities. Within the EU decision-
making process, it is the Commission - --  with its monopoly on legislative initiative - --  that must 
decide whether the crisis created a policy window for path breaking reforms. 
This paper asks whether the crisis experience induced the Commission to propose a more 
radical reform of the EU bank resolution regime that goes beyond the pre-crisis status quo. To 
answer this question, we first review the crisis experience. Building on the game-theoretic 
analysis we show that national authorities face conflicting incentives stemming from their 
exclusively national mandates to protect financial stability at no or the lowest possible cost to 
domestic taxpayers. We apply the concept of a globalization trilemma to the problem of the 
cross-border bank resolution and argue that there are two first-best solutions capable of 
containing the conflicts among national authorities. The resolution regime can either be 
shifted to the EU-level, which provides the largest possible jurisdiction matching the 
operations of large European banking groups, or it could be shifted back to the national level, 
which would require the cross-border banks to reorganize as a string of independent national 
subsidiaries. 
In the second part, we review the Commission’s Communication on cross-border crisis 
management in the context of the existing academic and policy literature in order to ascertain Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 5 of 31 
whether the crisis indeed created a policy window and whether the Commission tried to seize 
it by supporting more radical reform options.1
The paper provides answers to two simple questions: why did the Dutch and Belgians 
failed to resolve Fortis on multilateral bases despite the long tradition of cooperation and why 
is the EU not introducing reforms that could prevent such failures in future. The simple 
answer to both questions is the conflict of interests among key stakeholders. In the first case, 
uncertainty over the distribution of fiscal burdens undermines cross-border cooperation 
among national authorities, unless there are some binding commitments to cooperation and 
burden sharing. In the second case, the progress towards the EU level regime is blocked by 
member states’ concerns about infringements on fiscal sovereignty, whereas re-embedding of 
cross-border bank subsidiaries in national regulatory regimes is inhibited by the 
Commission’s and banks’ concerns over regulatory protectionism. The paper concludes that 
although the crisis created political momentum for reform, it did not align the interests of the 
key stakeholders behind any of the two first-best reform alternatives. 
 We show that the first-best reform options 
were seriously considered. This is a marked change from the pre-crisis debate, which confined 
such options only to academic literature. However, in its impact assessment of the proposed 
reforms (Commission 2009), the Commission decided to rally behind the strengthening and 
deepening of the pre-crisis policies. As the policy debate nears the final decision, the first-best 
options have been sidelined and the traditional EU approach has regained prominence. 
Unless the ongoing aftershocks of the financial crisis - --  such as the Eurozone response to the 
Greek problems of 2010 - --  open new policy windows on fiscal burden sharing, the post-crisis 
EU bank resolution regime will be merely an upgraded version of the pre-crisis one. Although 
such a regime constitutes an improvement, it preserves the conflicting incentives of national 
authorities that derail cooperative cross-border resolutions during crises. Such a regime lacks 
the capacity of the first-best solution to either prevent or internalize the positive and negative 
externalities of cross-border bank integration. 
                                            
1 The analysis is based on the Commission Communication on European Financial Supervision (COM(2009) 252 
final) and the subsequent inter-institutional negotiations leading to the adoption of the new architecture by the 
Council and the EP in September 2010, as well as the Communication on An EU Framework for Cross-Border 
Crisis Management in the Banking Sector (COM(2009) 561 final) and the related impact assessments. Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 6 of 31 
1. INTEGRATED BANKS AND THE NATIONAL RESOLUTION REGIME 
During the pre-crisis decade, the EU had witnessed an unprecedented wave of cross-
border mergers of large banks fueled by the internal dynamics of financial markets and the 
introduction of the euro (Dermine 2000, Veron 2007). At the onset of the financial crisis, 
there were 39 cross-border banks and around 100 other banking groups that had large 
subsidiaries or systemic branches in another member state (Commission 2009). Although 
they represent a small percentage of the total 8,300 EU banks, they are the most important as 
they control approximately 68% of total EU banking assets.  
Many observers argued for an introduction of a resolution regime capable of handling 
cross-border failures of large banks (Dermine 2000, Vives 2001, Schoenmaker 2009, but the 
attention of policy-makers was focused on the prevention of banking failures. The EU 
regulation and supervision regimes were updated through the Capital Requirement Directive, 
but the resolution regime received much less attention.  
The resolution regime forms the third line of defense against financial instability. It is 
invoked when regulation and supervision fail to prevent the fatal moment when authorities 
must decide whether to let a bank fail or intervene to keep it as a going concern, even if it 
requires putting fiscal resources at risk.2
An important goal of the bank resolution regime is to minimize the fiscal costs of banking 
crises. Although, there are rare cases when governments allow a large bank to fail or when a 
bank resolution is financed solely by the private sector, it is an empirically supported fact that 
governments tend to intervene and spend considerable resources in dealing with the 
consequences of banking crises. The EU experience during the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
 Neither of the two options is appealing, especially in 
the case of systemically important banks. Bank failure and liquidation induces the immediate 
risk of financial panic throughout the system. Bank bailouts then translate into increased 
responsibility for operation of the financial system and accumulation of fiscal liabilities. 
                                            
2  The bank resolution regime is a set of legal and administrative rules that authorities employ to support 
restructuring of an ailing bank, in order to maintain financial stability and ensure continuity of basic banking 
services. Certain functions of large banks such as credit provision, processing of payments and monetary 
transmission have the public good character and need to be preserved even if the bank becomes insolvent and 
should be wound up. The bank resolution regime, unlike corporate bankruptcy, recognizes these functions and 
provides tools to preserve them. Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 7 of 31 
conforms to this pattern. Nineteen EU governments introduced guarantees and 
recapitalizations, thus putting at risk fiscal resources equivalent to 32% of EU-wide GDP, out 
of which approximately a third was used by banks by mid 2010 (Commission 2010a). Such 
figures are consistent with the worldwide crisis experience over the last three decades, during 
which the estimated direct fiscal costs of a banking crisis were about 13% of GDP (Laeven and 
Valencia 2008).  
A novel aspect of public interventions in this crisis is their cross-border dimension. It is no 
longer sufficient to intervene on the national level, when an ailing bank is systemically 
important in several countries. The integration of banks introduced a new interdependency 
between governments, as the decision whether and how to intervene is related to the same 
choices of other governments. Unless any single government is willing to subsidize the 
resolution of a cross-border bank, they must cooperate and share the fiscal burden of the 
resolution.  
As in other interdependent situations, there is a scope for strategic behavior. The choice 
situation resembles the prisoner’s dilemma, when the cooperative solution is likely to be the 
least costly overall, but national authorities have an incentive to defect to a non-cooperative 
solution, if they believe that unilateral action would reduce their costs below their share in the 
cooperative solution. Two important characteristics further complicate cross-border 
resolution: firstly, banking crises tend to unfold with incredible speed and, secondly, the 
amount of fiscal resources required tends to be not only high, but also highly uncertain. 
Nevertheless, cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game should still be achievable, if the 
authorities involved can communicate effectively and make ex ante commitments enforceable 
by an independent third-party (Scharpf 1997). EU jurisdiction makes both of these conditions 
possible, providing that such communication and coordination rules are enshrined in EU 
legislation. 
Time pressure, high stakes and high uncertainty make calculated decisions in the heat of a 
banking crisis difficult. Without effective and binding rules, the authorities may misjudge the 
situation and defect to a unilateral option. They often have lass than 60 hours, between the 
time banks closes on Friday and reopen Monday, to agree on a resolution scenario, which may Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 8 of 31 
simply be impossible. Similarly, if one government believes that it can manage the resolution 
better than its partners in other EU countries, or if it believes that part of a cross-border bank 
within its jurisdiction controls assets of better quality than parts in other EU countries, then it 
may opt for uncooperative unilateral action. To reduce the effects of time pressure and high 
uncertainty on the choice between cooperation and defection, ex ante rules are required that 
guarantee effective communication, guide the search for cooperative action and ensures 
acceptable sharing of fiscal burdens. The pre-crisis regime tried to provide such rules through 
soft law arrangements and voluntary cooperation among authorities. 
   Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 9 of 31 
2. THE PRE-CRISIS RESOLUTION REGIME 
The pre-crisis resolution regime was not embedded in EU legislation. The Capital 
Requirement Directive stipulated only one resolution-related requirement: alerting the central 
banks and ministries of relevant member states about an emergency situation in a cross-
border bank. Similarly, the directives on the Deposit Guarantee Schemes and the 
Reorganization and Winding-up of Credit Institutions defined some guiding rules for cross-
border bankruptcy, but not for the resolution of a bank in crisis.  
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on high-level principles of cooperation 
between banking supervisors and central banks of the EU in crisis management was the first 
policy response to the eventuality of a cross-border bank resolution (ECB 2003). It was signed 
in March 2003 and defined the elementary principles of cross-border cooperation. It 
identified authorities responsible for crisis management and, specified the required flows of 
information and logistical infrastructure. It also dealt with stages of detection and the 
activation of specific supervisory and central banking tools in financial crises  (ECB 2005). 
The next MoU, adopted in May 2005, expanded the information exchange to include the 
sharing of prospective assessments among authorities potentially involved in a crisis situation. 
It  attempted to address problems in sharing confidential information and called for the 
development of contingency plans, on the national and EU level. At the same time, the 
information released about the MoU explicitly states that it is legally non-binding and 
contains no ex ante burden-sharing arrangement between national treasuries (ECB 2005). 
The 2003 and 2005 Memoranda were tested in a simulation exercise at the ECB in which 
banking supervisors, central banks and finance ministries from the then 25 EU countries 
participated. It revealed the inadequacy of the framework; cooperation was not sustained even 
under simulated crisis conditions (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2009). The ECOFIN Council 
responded by setting up a special working group charged with suggesting new arrangements 
for crisis management. Nevertheless, at the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007, the 
two MoUs were all that were in place for the EU bank resolution framework. 
The third generation MoU was signed only in June 2008. It was a multilateral agreement 
signed by all 114 member state authorities whose cooperation might be needed in the case of a Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 10 of 31 
resolution of a bank present in all 27 countries. Unlike previous MoUs, this was made public 
to bolster the preparedness of the EU to resolve a potential cross-border banking crisis. It 
deepened cooperation procedures by making them increasingly specific. It continued the 
trend towards developing specific arrangements tailored to the most important cross-border 
banks. The Memorandum called on relevant authorities to develop ‘‘voluntary specific 
cooperation agreements’’ and specify the ‘‘cross-border stability groups’’ charged with the 
crisis management and resolution of cross-border financial groups. 
The MoUs were indirectly supported by the new governance mechanisms that have 
emerged in the EU financial market policy over the last decade. The most notable were the 
Lamfalussy committees that were delegated some rule-making and monitoring powers as part 
of comitology reforms designed specifically for financial regulation (Quaglia 2008, 
Christiansen and Vaccari 2006). The Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) 
not only improved the consultation, decision-making and monitoring processes in EU 
banking regulation, but also provided a permanent cooperation platform for all member state 
regulators. Although, CEBS was not designed to deal with cross-border resolutions, it proved 
useful in handling the cross-border fall-out resulting from the Icelandic crisis (EFC 2009).  
The colleges of supervisors represent an additional governance mechanism that began to 
emerge before the onset of crisis. The requirements for consolidated accounting on the group 
level and the need for supervisory approval of the risk models under the Basel II rules have 
strengthened the role of   home supervisors. They increasingly played a coordinating role 
within the group of host-country supervisors of the 40 or so largest EU cross-border banking 
groups. The increasing formalization of the colleges put them in a position to act as the 
‘‘cross-border stability groups’’ called for by the 2008 MoU, and prepare the ‘‘voluntary 
specific cooperation agreements’’ that were supposed to include ex ante fiscal burden sharing 
rules. 
Overall, the pre-crisis cross-border resolution regime amounted to little more than soft 
law declarations supported by emerging committee-based governance mechanisms. The 
MoUs specified basic coordination rules, but left the burden sharing rules up to the colleges. 
These arrangements were explicitly voluntary and non-binding and thus unable to close the Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 11 of 31 
gap between cross-country banks and country-based resolution regimes, as demonstrated in 
the case of the Fortis resolution. 
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3. THE FORTIS EXPERIENCE 
The Fortis resolution provided the most direct test of the EU cross-border bank resolution 
regime. The bank had a systemic presence in all three Benelux countries, which have a strong 
tradition of policy coordination. Moreover, it was one of the banking groups with the most 
developed ex ante cooperation arrangements among its supervisors that dated back to 2002 
(Van den Spiegel 2008). Nevertheless, when these arrangements were tested by the crisis, they 
failed to sustain a fully cooperative multilateral resolution.  
Fortis was created by a merger of several Dutch and Belgian banks and insurance 
companies in 1990. It expanded rapidly throughout the EU and later globally; in 2007 it 
acquired ABN AMRO in the largest-ever banking takeover. Fortis became one of the largest 
EU financial institutions, and its balance sheet exceeded the  GDP of all three Benelux 
countries. Fortis Group had its headquarters in Brussels, and the Belgian financial authority 
was its home-country supervisor.  
Following the turbulences in global financial markets, Fortis Bank - --  the entity controlling 
the three Fortis banks in the Benelux countries and the retail operations ABN AMRO - --  
experienced difficulties in financing the 2007 acquisition. This led to a dramatic fall in its 
share price and the replacement of several key banking officers. The situation escalated on 
Friday, 26 September, when bankruptcy rumors led institutional clients to withdraw €20bn in 
deposits (Fortis 2008, Commission 2009). The expectation was that a further €30 bn would be 
withdrawn when the bank opened on Monday. At the time, Fortis no longer had access to the 
interbank market and was relying on an emergency liquidity scheme provided by the central 
banks of Belgium and the Netherlands. Although Fortis was technically solvent at a time 
(Cihak and Nier 2009:23), something had to be done to stop the run on the banks’ deposits. 
The Benelux governments approached Fortis with an offer of assistance and negotiated a 
capital increase of €11.2 bn that would partially nationalize Fortis banks. The Netherlands and 
Luxembourg would invest €4 bn and €2.5 bn in exchange for 49% of shares in Fortis Bank 
Nederland and Fortis Banque Luxembourg, respectively. The Belgian government was to 
invest €4.7 bn in exchange for 49% of Fortis Bank, which controlled all three Fortis banks in 
the Benelux countries. The Dutch government, however, later withdrew from this plan. Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 13 of 31 
Even before it turned out that the plan would not be implemented, it became clear that it 
would be inadequate. The run on Fortis banks continued and they had drawn nearly €60 bn of 
the emergency liquidity (Fortis 2008). On 2 October 2008, the Dutch authorities announced 
their intention to impose forced administration on the banking and insurance activities of 
Fortis in the Netherlands.3
Prior to the critical week, the Benelux authorities had three options for organizing 
financial assistance. The first was to rely only on Belgium, the home country of Fortis; the 
second was a coordinated multilateral bailout; and the third was a unilateral bailout of the 
Fortis parts in each country. The first option was used in the case of other banks such as ING 
in the Netherlands and KBC in Belgium, but since Fortis had systemic presence in all three 
countries it would result in a massive cross-border subsidy. The governments of the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg recognized this and offered their support to the rescue plans. 
 This gave the Belgian authorities and Fortis directors little room to 
negotiate, thus they agreed to sell the Dutch parts of Fortis after negotiating a price increase 
from the initial €9 bn to the final €16.8 bn. Luxembourg increased its share in Fortis Banque 
to 52%, and Belgium acquired the remaining domestic and international banking and 
insurance activities of Fortis (Cihak and Nier 2009). The government takeovers stabilized 
Fortis and the attention shifted towards consolidation and sale of the acquired assets. This 
phase of the resolution was conducted on the national level and is thus not relevant for the 
discussion of cross-border issues. 
The second option - --  multilateral action - --  was the one expected by the MoUs, which called 
for ‘‘voluntary specific cooperation agreements’’ to deal with such situations. The third option 
- --  unilateral action - --  would correspond to the pre-single market approach, when a cross-
border bank would be split along national borders and respective national authorities would 
resolve each part. The choice between the second and third options can be modeled as a 
prisoner’s dilemma game (Figure 1). The multilateral resolution would correspond to a 
multilateral outcome (M, M in Figure 1), whereas the unilateral resolution corresponds to the 
unilateral outcome (U,U). 
                                            
3  Given that the Fortis bank, ABN AMBRO and Fortis insurance firms were all organized as nationally 
incorporated subsidiaries - --  not branches - --  the EU legislation provided the Dutch authorities with full right to 
impose forced administration according to national laws. Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 14 of 31 
Figure 1: The prisoner’s dilemma in cross-border bank resolutions 
 
    Netherlands 
    Multilateral (M)  Unilateral (U) 
Belgium  Multilateral (M)  3, 3  1, 4 
Unilateral (U)  4, 1  2, 2* 
 
Note: * Nash equilibrium. The higher the number in cell, the more preferred the outcome for given player. 
Preferences are expressed in terms of ranking of pay-offs; the highest payoff (4) is the most preferred solution of 
a given actor. As our purpose is to demonstrate the conflicting incentives, we simplify the presentation of the 
Fortis case by focusing on the interaction between the Belgian and Dutch authorities. The Luxembourg 
government seemed willing to adapt to outcomes of their negotiations. 
 
Given that all three governments were prepared to offer support to Fortis, multilateral 
action seemed to be the most likely option. Yet, the final resolution was unilateral. The answer 
to this puzzling outcome lies primarily in the absence of EU-level rules on banking resolutions 
that would credibly align the conflicting incentives of national authorities. 
The 2008 MoU was signed only three months before the Fortis crisis, thus the envisaged 
agreements for the cross-border resolution were not yet fully in place. However, the Benelux 
banking authorities have a long track record of policy cooperation, so they should have been 
able to agree on an ad hoc solution. Indeed, the first intervention agreed on 28 September 
2008 was planned as a multilateral action, until the Dutch authorities chose not to carry it 
through. 
Multilateral action would, in principle, be in the best interest of the intervening 
governments because it preserves the benefits of internal integration of cross-border banks 
and avoids the costs of breaking them up along national borders.4
                                            
4
 The Fortis directors believed that multilateral resolution would be more efficient (Fortis, 2008), which is a view 
shared by some independent observers as well (Cihak and Nier, 2009) 
 Cross-border banks such as 
Fortis gained considerable efficiencies from integrating their internal functions across 
national boundaries. Increasingly, strategic decision-making, capital management and 
allocation, risk management and auditing were concentrated at the headquarters of cross-
border financial groups, while other functions - --   such as back-office, information 
technologies, liquidity management, asset and liabilities management or human resources Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 15 of 31 
management - --  were similarly concentrated on the group level, although not necessarily in the 
home country (van den Siegel 2008). Multilateral action should preserve this arrangement and 
avoid a chaotic break up of subsidiaries that are not operationally independent.5
However, a multilateral resolution inevitably pools not only the fiscal risk of intervention 
across participating countries, but also gives them a stake in later sales of assets that may offset 
the cost of intervention. Pooling these risks and benefits limits the extent of good and bad 
surprises, when governments opting for unilateral action discover that their part of the cross-
border bank is in much better or worse shape than expected. However, the governments that 
believe the parts of the cross-border group in their territory are in much better shape than the 
others would then prefer unilateral action as a less costly option. Indeed, this was the Dutch 
justification for their ultimatum (Fortis 2008:17), confirmed by the Dutch Finance Minister 
who argued that '[the Dutch side] had managed to buy the better part of Fortis, leaving the 
worse one to the Belgians' (Beck et al. 2010: 73).
 
6
This view was disputed by the Fortis as well as the Belgian authorities, who argued that a 
substantial proportion of the emergency credit lines granted to Fortis Bank by the Belgian 
National Bank had actually served to finance the Dutch banking operations (Fortis 2008). The 
Fortis directors and Belgian authorities could, of course, refuse to approve the sale of the 
Dutch assets and try to renegotiate the Dutch ultimatum. However, there was little time under 
the pressure of the escalating crisis and the risk of delaying action was too high. When the 
Dutch agreed to increase the offer from €9 bn to €16.8 bn, the Belgian side agreed to the 
unilateral resolution. 
 
Given the belief of the Dutch authorities in the viability of the Dutch parts of Fortis, their 
decision to pursue unilateral action seems legitimate. The Dutch, as well as other national 
authorities, are bound by their national mandates to ensure financial stability and, if a fiscal 
intervention becomes necessary, to minimize its impact on domestic taxpayers. If the Dutch 
                                            
5
 The fact that the retail operations of the ABN AMRO were not yet integrated into the Fortis group limited the 
costs and complexity of the Fortis break up. 
6
  The Minister of Finance also pointed out that the Dutch authorities joined the negotiations  only on 28 
September, when they advanced towards a solution that did not give the Dutch control in all entities they cared 
about (Het Financieele Dagblad, Dec 24, 2008). They were offered 49% in Fortis Bank Netherlands, but ABN 
AMRO and Fortis insurance in the Netherlands remained under control of the Fortis entity in which the Belgian 
authorities invested. There was no time to renegotiate before the announcement of the plan. Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 16 of 31 
authorities judged multilateral action as more risky and expensive, they  would  - --   in the 
absence of any rules committing them to minimize the overall resolution costs - --  breach their 
fiduciary duties by agreeing to it.7 The same logic applies to the Belgian authorities providing 
that they judge the price of the buyout of the Dutch parts as adequate. The problem of such an 
agreement may arise only if one or both sides misjudge the value of assets and the expected 
resolution costs due to uncertainty during a crisis. In such a case, one side may end up 
providing a massive cross-border subsidy towards the resolution costs, which may strain 
future relationships.8
The 3 October agreement clearly does not constitute cooperative multilateral resolution 
(M,M). But does it correspond to the unilateral Nash equilibrium (U,U)? In the absence of 
binding rules, the Dutch and Belgian authorities resorted to national resolutions, which was 
their less-preferred option as it destroyed the cross-border franchise of Fortis. However, there 
is also a possibility that one government emerged from the crisis better off then the other, 
corresponding to the (U,M) or (M,U) outcomes of the game. This ultimately depends on 
whether the Dutch paid a fair price under the circumstances (U,U) or overpaid, in which case 
they implicitly subsidized the resolution costs in Belgium (U,M), or underpaid, in which case 
the implicit subsidy goes in the other direction (M,U). This will become clearer after the 
Benelux authorities dispose of assets acquired in the transaction and estimate the total costs of 
the Fortis resolution. Immediately after the transaction, the Belgian side feared that Fortis’ 




Whatever the case may be, the Fortis resolution has clearly shown that the pre-crisis EU 
cross-border bank resolution regime was not robust enough to support the most efficient 
cooperative multilateral resolution. The communication procedures did not ensure full access 
 
                                            
7 The Dutch were partially vindicated in their preference for unilateral resolution by the fact that they avoided the 
difficulties that the Belgian side experienced in obtaining shareholder approval for the sale of Fortis to BNP 
Paribas. 
8 The UK and Dutch subsidy towards the resolution of the Icelandic banks’ branches in these countries has put 
their relationship with Iceland under strain. Two years after the event, they are still trying to reach agreement on 
the repayment schedule. 
9 When the sale was announced, the Financial Times questioned several market participants who argued that the 
Dutch bought the Fortis assets at a discount of as much as €10 bn (FT Oct 4, 2008). Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 17 of 31 
to initial negotiations, which made the original plan unacceptable to the Dutch. The MoUs 
burden sharing rules were either non-existent or not helpful in the negotiations of a 
multilateral resolution under severe time pressure. The agreed ad hoc solution will prove 
acceptable, only as far as it strikes a reasonable balance in terms of sharing the fiscal burden of 
the resolution. Moreover, the sale was accepted only after a unilateral threat to seize the Dutch 
assets by forced administration; had the Dutch authorities not been flexible on price, the 
situation could have ended up in a deadlock inviting chaotic collapse and sharp conflict 
between the Dutch and Belgian authorities. Overall, the Fortis case represents a successfully 
managed failure of the EU cross-border resolution regime that in actuality could end up a lot 
worse. 
The prisoner’s dilemma outlines the conflicting incentives arising from the mismatch 
between the national accountability of resolution authorities and the cross-border character of 
banks. On a more general level, this represents the conflict among the three objectives of EU 
policy that aims to foster financial stability and cross-border banking, while respecting 
national bank resolution regimes. This conflict is well captured by the concept of the 
globalization trilemma that also delineates the policy space for post-crisis reforms. 
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4. A POLICY TRILEMMA   
The policy trilemma states that only two out of the following three policy goals can be 
achieved simultaneously (Rodrik 2000, Schoenmaker and Oosterloo 2008): (i) stability of the 
banking system under stress, (ii) sustaining an integrated cross-border bank under stress and 
(iii) maintaining national control over the bank resolution regime. The first goal is self-
evident; the whole purpose of banking regulation, supervision and resolution regimes is 
maintaining financial stability. The second goal is implied by the Single Market objectives of 
the Treaty, which aims to establish the freedom of capital movement and freedom to provide 
services across the EU. The third goal is not an objective in its own right; rather it is a 
corollary of member states’ desire to maintain control over their fiscal outlays and prevent the 
EU from making fiscal commitments on their behalf. 
The trilemma implies that there are three possible outcomes. First, the EU may achieve its 
objectives of financial stability and integration, but sustaining these two goals under adverse 
market conditions would require member states to support a resolution regime for cross-
border banks on the EU level (outcome 1, Figure 2). Second, financial stability under stress 
can be maintained if banks operate as nationally incorporated units with full operational and 
financial independence, i.e. they are not fully integrated in the internal structure of the 
transnational financial group, and thus their resolution can be performed on the national level 
without large externalities imposed on other countries (outcome 2). Third, integrated banks 
can be supported by a national resolution regime, but only at the expense of higher risk that 
their stability will not be maintained under difficult market conditions (outcome 3). The first 
outcome is the one to which the EU aspires. At the same time, it struggles to overcome the 
legal and political constraints associated with this option. The second outcome would largely 
mean a return to the pre-1992 situation when banking markets were mutually open, but cross-
border banks were not operationally integrated. Finally, the third outcome is what was in 
place before the current crisis. 
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Outcome 1  Outcome 2  Outcome 3 
Lower risks of instability 
under stress 
Lower risks of instability 
under stress 
Higher risk of instability 
under stress 










The Fortis case supports the validity of the trilemma as it shows that the national 
accountability of regulators and treasuries made it impossible to sustain financial stability 
without breaking the cross-border banks into national parts. Unless the post-crisis reform 
shifts the resolution regime up to the EU-level or back to the national level, the trilemma 
would suggest that the breakup of cross-border banks is the most likely outcome of the 
resolution process. The trilemma thus delineates the policy space for debate on post-crisis 
reform of the cross-border bank resolution regime in the EU. 
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5. POST-CRISIS REFORMS 
The answer to the absence of a robust cross-border resolution regime before the crisis lies 
as much in the complacency caused by the previous long period of financial stability as in the 
method of European integration. The EU had experienced occasional crises with cross-border 
implications before the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Failures of EU-based banks like Herstatt 
Bank, BCCI or Credit Lyonnais triggered regulatory responses formulated on the global as 
well as the European level. However, such isolated incidents did not seem to merit the effort 
required to develop a cross-border resolution regime. This perception began to change during 
the pre-crisis decade as banks expanded across borders. 
The traditional EU strategy is to put market integration first  and integrate the 
underpinning institutional framework only in response to market integration (Sandholtz and 
Stone Sweet 1998). It tends to create a virtuous cycle if market forces support the successive 
steps of institutional integration as it becomes necessary to proceed beyond the harmonized 
minimum. However, such an approach creates regulatory gaps, if market actors can no longer 
be effectively regulated on the national level, but there is not yet any reasonable EU-level 
regulation. 
The Commission avoided putting the cross-border resolution regime on the legislative 
agenda, because the informal response from member states was consistently negative (Speyer 
and Walter 2009). Similarly, when the ECB tried to expand on the limited financial stability 
mandate given to its Banking Supervision Committee the Maastricht Treaty, the Eurozone as 
well as the UK pushed back vigorously (Posner and Veron 2010). As a result, there was no 
binding legal framework for bank resolution before the crisis and the Eurosystem central 
banks were limited to their role of lenders of last resort. 
The crisis experience offered an opportunity to reconsider the bank resolution framework. 
It created a policy window for the Commission to try to propose more radical reforms. The 
remainder of this paper reviews the Commission’s Communication on An EU Framework for 
Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector. We ask whether the Commission 
considered any of the polar options suggested by the trilemma and specified in the academic 
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6. THE EU-LEVEL RESOLUTION REGIME 
The EU-level resolution regime for cross-border banks represents the first-best solution 
from the point of view of economic efficiency. It would allow for internalization of positive 
externalities, such as efficiency gains from cross-border integration, as  well as negative 
externalities, such as contagion in the case of financial instability. It would permit resolution 
strategies that minimize the overall costs of bank resolution and prevent national responses 
that minimize national costs while increasing overall costs. In its most extreme form, the EU-
level resolution regime would be operated by a European Financial Supervision Agency that 
would operate according to EU law and be backed by EU-level fiscal capacity.  
Schoenmaker (2009) explores the possibilities of creating a single EU financial regulator 
and proposes a similar process that led to the institutionalization of the ECB. However, he also 
points out that there is no Treaty base for a single financial regulator. The limited financial 
stability mandate that the Treaty confers on the ECB can be expanded neither to non-banking 
financial services, such as insurance and securities, nor to non-Eurozone countries. Thus, a 
change in the Treaty is a prerequisite for the creation of a single EU regulator that could avoid 
the conflict of incentives stemming from the national mandates of resolution authorities.  
The rules for the resolution of cross-border banks could be provided by the ‘28th’ EU-level 
legal regime operating alongside the national banking laws. Cihak and Decressin (2007) 
discuss the potential benefits of a European Baking Charter that would allow national banks 
to stay within the national regime, whereas cross-border banks could either accept an EU-
level regime or organize themselves as a holding company of national banks. They argue that 
creating an EU-level legal regime is more plausible than full harmonization of banking 
regulation, supervision and resolution across the EU. However, even if the resolution of cross-
border banks is specified in a directive, fiscal backing is still necessary to make it operational. 
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) explore two possible mechanisms for EU-level fiscal 
burden sharing. The first proposal is based on full solidarity between EU member states; the 
second is  specific to countries in which the given cross-border bank is present. Both 
mechanisms assume that either the ECB or the European Investment Bank (EIB) would be 
given the right to issue bonds to finance a cross-border resolution. The bonds would be Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 22 of 31 
guaranteed jointly by member states according to some capital key based on GDP shares and 
other variables. In the case of full solidarity, all EU members would guarantee and finance the 
scheme; in the case of a specific mechanism, only those where the cross-border bank operates 
would provide financing. However, as Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) also point out, such 
a scheme would violate the Treaty prohibition on financing fiscal outlays through monetary 
financing. This could be avoided if the scheme is pre-financed via bank resolution funds 
subsidized by a levy on banks (see Commission 2010). Alternatively, fiscal backing could rely 
on bond guarantees provided directly by each member state in a similar manner as the €440 
bn guarantee behind the European Financial Stability Facility outlined in May 2010 to manage 
the Greek crisis.  
Even if the funding issue was resolved, member states would still have to agree on the 
formula distributing the losses incurred by the EU-level scheme. A simple formula based on 
GDP or another variable is unlikely to be politically acceptable, as it would be insensitive to 
the importance of a given bank to any given economy. It would also create a moral hazard 
problem if states reduce efforts and resources dedicated to the supervision of banks, as they 
would no longer bear the full cost of the resolution. A more plausible formula would involve 
only member states where the cross-border bank has a substantial market presence and would 
be based on number of relevant variables. The 2008 MoUs suggested burden sharing based on 
the expected economic impact of cross-border bank failure on the member states concerned 
and the allocation of home and host supervisory responsibilities among member states. The 
De Laroisiere report (2009) suggested expanding the list of principles by some of the following 
criteria: the deposits of the institution; assets; revenue flows; the share of payment system 
flows; the division of supervisory responsibility with the party responsible for supervisory 
work, analysis and decisions being also responsible for an appropriately larger share of the 
costs. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) suggested a quantifiable formula based on average 
foreign assets to total assets, foreign income to total income, and foreign employment to total 
employment within the banking sector of a member state, while all other suggestions remain 
quantified and subjected to policy debate. Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 23 of 31 
Although the EU-level resolution regime has been outlined in the academic and policy 
literature, it has so far failed to address the key issues of legal foundations for a single EU 
financial supervisor, raising funding for bank rescues and sharing the fiscal burden. The 
policies suggested in the literature would require important legal changes, and the crisis 
experience did not seem to create sufficient political momentum to introduce them. In this 
respect, the crisis did not create a policy window for the introduction of a EU-level resolution 
regime. The Communication on Cross-Border Crisis Management (Commission 2009) as well 
as other policy reform proposals refer to EU-level policy options, only to dismiss them as 
politically and legally implausible. At the same time, the political momentum behind a levy on 
banks or the need to defend the stability of the Eurozone would allow for the creation of a new 
funding mechanism that could be used. 
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7. RETURN TO NATIONAL RESOLUTION REGIMES 
Splitting cross-border banks into a network of independent national entities is the polar 
opposite of an EU-level resolution regime. Such a reform would force banks to reorganize so 
that their operations, regulation, supervision and resolution would be conducted strictly on a 
national basis. This option - --   dubbed subsidiarization - --   would substantially reduce the 
mismatch between cross-border banks and national regulations by making banks national. 
There would be no need for a cross-border regime, as banks would be resolved by national 
authorities, according to national rules and with national fiscal resources. 
Many aspects of the current EU framework for retail commercial banks are compatible 
with subsidiarization. National subsidiaries - --  but not branches - --  of cross-border banks must 
meet all criteria for a banking license, thus they have formally independent management and 
governance systems and capital bases to meet prudential requirements. Although formally 
separate, many of the operational processes are centralized in practice, as was the case with 
Fortis banks. Subsidiarization would impose the onus of reforms on cross-border banks that 
would have to decentralize and undo their internal integration. 
The UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA 2009) brought subsidiarization into debate. It 
reflects the UK’s experience during the crisis when its government bore full costs of stabilizing 
interventions in UK-based banks, but the benefits were spread across many of their cross-
border counterparties. Moreover, the UK was also confronted with the situation when 
Iceland, as the home country of Icelandic banks, could not afford to rescue them or even pay 
out the mandatory deposit insurance. This only added to the fiscal strain of UK banking 
bailouts and led the FSA to put subsidiarization on the table. 
Large international banks immediately countered the idea, arguing that even if national 
subsidiaries were connected only by brand name, there would still be cross-border spillovers 
(IIF 2009, Ackerman in the Financial Times, 29 July 2009). In their view, subsidiarization 
would undo the achievements of EU banking integration without addressing the lack of 
internationally coordinated crisis management. The former argument resonated with the 
Commission, which is keen to preserve banking integration. In its Communication, the 
Commission argued that confining banking assets to single jurisdictions would inevitably Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 25 of 31 
translate into restrictions on the cross-border provision of services or establishment, and thus 
dismissed subsidiarization on legal grounds (Commission 2009). 
On the other hand, the subsidiarization idea resonated within the EU host countries that 
were keen to protect their local subsidiaries, comparable to the Dutch authorities in the Fortis 
case. They insisted on bolstering their liquidity and capital positions given the new risks 
generated by the crisis, and were prepared to scrutinize carefully any intra-group transfers 
that trapped liquidity - --   which could be used for stabilization of the whole cross-border 
financial group - --  in its subsidiaries (Unicredit 2009). Paradoxically, subsidiarization could be 
reinforced by the Commission proposals for an EU network of national bank resolution funds 
(Commission 2010a). The Commission views these proposals as a stepping-stone towards an 
EU Resolution Fund, but national pots of liquidity are likely to strengthen national 
accountability for resolution and undermine incentives for cross-border cooperation. 
The crisis experience led the Commission to consider the subsidiarization option, but only 
to dismiss it on legal grounds (see Figure 3 for a summary). The Commission staff argued that 
returning the resolution regime to the national level would require modification of the Treaty 
that could undermine the internal market (Commission 2009:39). 
Figure 3: Polar policy options compared 
 
Criteria  EU regime  National regime 
Characteristics 
- Single EU regulator 
- EU resolution laws 
- EU funding scheme 
- National authorities in 
charge 
- Single passport restricted 
- National financing only 
Reform implications for 
cross-border banks 
- Comply with EU bank 
charter (“28th banking law”) 
- Turning branches to 
subsidiaries 
- Restoring operational 
independence of subsidiaries 
Reform implications for 
member states 
- Outsource resolution to EU 
bodies 
- Accept the fiscal 
implications 
- No need for cross-border 
regime 
- Responsibility and costs 
fully on national level 
Legal constraints 
- No Treaty-base for single 
EU supervisor 
- Financing may violate the 
Treaty 
- Restricts internal market 
freedoms 
- Difficult for non-retail 
firms 
Political constraints 
- No agreement on burden 
sharing formula 
- Global banks oppose 
- Commission not keen 
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8. TRADITIONAL RESPONSE: GOVERNANCE INNOVATIONS AND MORE 
SOFT LAW 
The favorite response of the EU to challenges arising from the financial sector is to ask a 
committee of wise men what should be done. The most recent example is an ad hoc high-level 
group on financial supervision chaired by Jacques de Larosiere that was asked to suggest the 
post-crisis financial sector reform agenda. The committee deliberately avoided politically 
contentious issues, such as the introduction of a single EU supervisor and fiscal burden 
sharing, and focused instead on two new governance mechanisms that also have a bearing on 
the cross-border resolution regime (de Larosiere 2009).  
The committee proposed establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) charged 
with identifying risks in the system and issuing warnings that the relevant authorities would 
have to explicitly address. Furthermore, it recommended developing a European System of 
Financial Supervisors (ESFS), which would be charged with coordination in emergency 
situations and resolution of disagreements among national supervisors. At the core of the 
ESFS proposal is the transformation of the existing Level 3 Lamfalussy committees into 
European Supervisory Authorities, so that the current Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors would become the European Banking Authority (EBA). The EBA would not only 
receive an independent chairperson, staff, legal status and EU funding, but also increased 
powers to coordinate the work of national supervisors, especially during crises with cross-
border implications. Importantly, the EBA would also be able to impose mandatory mediation 
of disputes among national supervisors. Its additional duties would include the development 
of a harmonized EU rulebook on financial supervision, supervision of credit rating agencies 
and developing an EU-wide database of confidential prudential information (Commission 
2009). 
The EBA can impose binding obligations on national supervisors only if they disagree 
among themselves or if the Commission declares an emergency situation. In the case of 
disagreement, the EBA’s decision-making body, which comprises its chairperson and heads of 
national supervisory authorities, can adopt binding arbitration decisions by qualified majority Working Paper No: 08/2010    Page 27 of 31 
vote (Gros  2009). In an emergency situation, the EBA may assume a coordinating role 
between national supervisors and adopt decisions requiring national supervisors to take 
action. These powers are, however, subject to a number of political safeguards, including a 
fiscal clause declaring that its decisions may not in any way impinge on the fiscal 
responsibilities of member states. It was introduced at the insistence of the UK, which refused 
to accept any EU-level rule that could result in binding fiscal commitments (EurActiv Dec 3, 
2009). The UK has also insisted on additional "triple-lock" safeguards that can undo the EBA’s 
decisions. The first is the right of any member state to appeal to the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council to suspend any EBA decision; the second is the right of a simple majority of at 
least 14 member states to overturn an EBA decision; and the third is the right of any member 
state to appeal to the European Council, if the first two options fail.  
The ESFS and EBA proposals reshape the governance arrangements but fall short of 
specifying any legislative rules guiding cross-border resolutions. The rules are derived only 
from the MoUs that call for, but do not prescribe, ‘voluntary specific cooperation agreements’. 
In its Communication, the Commission considered the compulsory introduction of recovery 
and resolution plans ('living wills') for all cross-border banks. Making banks responsible for 
such plans could ensure that the voluntary agreements are actually developed and agreed 
upon within the colleges of supervisors (see Avgouleas et al. 2010). 
The ESFS/EBA regime and associated improvements in soft law rules could resolve the 
prisoner’s dilemma by providing effective communication and credible commitment to ex 
ante  rules. However, numerous safeguards reduce the credibility of the EBA’s powers. 
Moreover, the proposed governance arrangements remain punishingly complex, which is 
likely to render them inefficient under the time pressure and uncertainty of banking crises. 
These improvements are unlikely to be equivalent to an EU-level resolution regime, thus the 
trilemma logic would still predict recourse to unilateral resolution of cross-border banks. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
The crisis experience in general and the Fortis experience in particular made a strong case 
for the reform of the EU cross-border bank resolution regime. The Commission reflected on 
this crisis as well as on the reform options suggested in the literature. Ultimately, the 
Commission concluded that the political and legal constraints that prevented the adoption of 
the more robust pre-crisis regime remain firmly in place. Therefore, the crisis experience did 
not pave the way for more radical reforms, and the proposals in the Communication stick to 
the traditional recipe of deepening existing soft law and strengthening the pre-crisis 
governance framework. The initial response of the Council to related proposals on the 
financial supervision architecture also indicates that the traditional concerns over the fiscal 
sovereignty, on one hand, and market freedoms, on the other, will prevail. In short, the crisis 
experience did not lift any of these constraints and thus did not open a policy window for 
path-breaking reforms. 
The EU is set on the reform path that relies on voluntary cooperation underpinned only 
by soft law rules and punishingly complex governance structures. These are not well suited to 
support multilateral resolution of cross-border banks that must be decided by national 
authorities under the severe time pressure and uncertainty of acute crisis. At the same time, 
the outcome of negotiations among the Commission, Council and European Parliament may 
be different from the original proposal. Moreover, the recent shift towards more 
supranational governance of the Eurozone, and the likely institutionalization of the European 
Financial Stability Facility introduced in response to the aftershocks of the financial crisis, 
may open an additional policy window for the reform of the EU cross-border bank resolution 
regime. These developments, together with strong lobbying of transnational banks, may shift 
the politics of reform towards a more supranational regime. On the contrary, should any of 
these responses to emergencies fail, the pendulum of regulatory reform may swing towards 
national solutions. What is certain, for now, is that the initial crisis experience was on its own 
insufficient to encourage more radical reform proposals. 
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